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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper studies a form of product bundling where a good is o¤ered for sale under
both a regular price and a group purchase discount if the group size the bundle size
meets certain requirement. The dening characteristic of this selling format is that the
purchase of the bundle is made by di¤erent consumers and hence we term it interpersonal
bundling rather than by a single consumer as under traditional mixed bundling.1
Interpersonal bundling (denoted as IB) is a widely observed selling practice. In many
markets and for many goods, multiple consumers may form a purchase group to qualify for
a group discount, as, for example, when buying tickets for a concert, purchasing a tour, or
dining at a restaurant.2 In recent years, many Internet sites have emerged that allow sellers
to o¤er IB, where consumers purchasing with group coupons receive substantial discounts
when the minimum group size is reached. Launched in November 2008, Groupon was a
pioneer in this selling format on the Internet, and it exceeded a billion dollars in revenue
in just its third year of operation (Levin, 2012).3 Despite its popularity, the pricing and
protability of interpersonal bundling have not been studied in a general framework that
allows a menu of bundle sizes. How should a seller optimally choose prices and bundle sizes?
When will IB be more protable than separate selling?4 What determine the magnitude of
its prot advantage? We provide some answers to these questions in this study.
1Mixed bundling refers to o¤ering goods for sale both as a package and as individual components.
2Miller Farms, a local family farm in Colorado, runs the Fall Harvest Festival each year. In 2012, a
customer is charged $15 to participate in the Festival and pick up vegetables to take home. For a group of
10 or more, the price per person is lowered to $13.
3Many other group buying websites o¤er variants of interpersonal bundling, including Livingsocial, where
a consumer receives a free deal if she gets three people buy the product. There are numerous interpersonal
bundling sites around the global, such as uBuyiBuy, Gaopeng, and Lashou in Asia, MyCityDeal in Europe,
Downtown Colombia in South America, and Spreets in Australia.
4Here, separate selling means o¤ering a good for sale under a single unit price to all consumers, whereas
a pure bundle would consist of multiple units of the same good under a unit price for group purchase.
The recent economics literature has investigated product bundling that is di¤erent from traditional mixed
bundling. See, for example, the study of bundle size pricing by Chu, Leslie, and Sorensen (2011), and of
inter-rm bundling by Gans and King (2006) and Armstrong (2012).
1
The literature on product bundling has found that mixed bundling often is more protable
than separate selling through two main mechanisms: segmenting the consumer population
to facilitate price discrimination and reducing the dispersion of consumer values to extract
consumer surplus (e.g., Adams and Yellen 1976; Schmalensee, 1984; Long, 1984; McAfee,
McMillan, and Whinston 1989; and Chen and Riordan, 2013).5 This paper will explore an
alternative motive for bundling: as a protable strategy in response to demand uncertainty.
While this motive can also arise when each bundle is purchased by an individual consumer,6
it is especially relevant and important for interpersonal bundling.
We consider a stylized model where a monopolist sells to a population of low- and high-
value consumers, with the numbers of these consumers being uncertain and following some
joint probability distribution. Under separate selling, the seller would ideally pursue a high-
price strategy if high-value consumers is numerous, or a low-price strategy that will also
attract low-value consumers if their number is su¢ ciently large. However, because price is
set before the uncertainty is resolved, a single price is generally not optimal. By o¤ering the
good for sale under IB, it is possible that a high or low price will become e¤ective only when
that price is optimal under the demand realization. Thus, interpersonal bundling potentially
enables the seller to use optimal option pricing under uncertain demand, leading to higher
prot than separate selling.
Our analysis of this model, in a general setting where the seller can commit to a menu
that species multiple bundle size intervals to which the group discount applies, leads to
two results. First, we show that a bundle menu with at most two (disjoint) intervals is more
protable than separate selling, provided that demand uncertainty is relevant for the choice
of optimal prices under separate selling. Second, under a plausible su¢ cient condition, IB
5 In a standard model of two goods, some consumers may value one good highly but another very little,
while others may value two goods together relatively highly, and values for the bundle may be less dispersed
than values for individual goods. By charging the former (who purchase only a single unit) a higher price
and the latter a bundle discount, mixed bundling generally leads to higher prot than separate selling.
6Under standard mixed bundling with two goods, there can be uncertainties on each individual consumers
valuation for the two goods, and mixed bundling can thus be viewed as a form of option pricing, where a
consumer will obtain the bundle discount only if she has su¢ ciently high demand for both goods.
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achieves the highest prot among all possible selling mechanisms. Both results are obtained
without assuming functional forms on the joint distribution of consumer numbers, and they
provide a general and elegant characterization of the properties of interpersonal bundling.
To gain insights on when the general conditions on the protability of IB are satised
and how to implement IB in various market environments, we further study two especially
simple forms of IB: interpersonal bundling with a minimum or maximum group size, denoted
respectively as IBmin or IBmax. For each of them, we derive a su¢ cient condition for its
superiority over separate selling. Interestingly, these two conditions, both invariant to
the functional form of the consumer distributions, reveal contrasting patterns of demand
uncertainty. Specically, relative to separate selling, IBmin tends to be more protable when
the number of low-value consumers is more dispersed, whereas IBmax tends to be more
protable when the number of high-value consumers is more dispersed. On the other hand,
their protability is also a¤ected by some other aspects of the market environment in similar
ways. We illuminate the intuition behind these ndings, relate them to observed marketing
practices, and suggest that IBmax, as a potentially protable marketing innovation, can
be implemented similarly as IBmin on the Internet and through intermediaries such as
Groupon and Amazon.
We further explore how a seller may incorporate additional strategic considerations in
the design of IBmin, by explicitly modeling the decision process of individual consumers
in two variants of the main model. In the rst variant, we allow the possibility that some
consumers are initially uninformed about the existence of the sellers product. Then, in
order to qualify for the group discount, informed consumers may take (costly) actions to
transmit product information to the uninformed, and the seller can exploit this incentive
in setting the bundle size. IBmin can thus increase the sellers prot by facilitating the
dissemination of product information.7
7This informational role of group buying has also been identied and explored in Jing and Xie (2011),
but their model focuses on exogenously xed group size and known demand. By contrast, bundle size is a
key decision variable in our analysis of IBmin, and demand uncertainty is a central feature of our model
that interacts with the consideration for information transmission.
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In the second variant, we consider the possibility that high-value consumers need to incur
transaction costs to sign up for group purchase. The seller may then partially segment the
consumer population, charging the regular price to high-value consumers with high sign-up
costs while attracting low-value consumers with the bundle discount. To allow for a richer
modeling of consumersdecision process, we consider two forms of IBmin in a two-period
setting: a simultaneous format where the seller does not inform period-2 consumers how
many buyers signed up in period 1, and a sequential format where the seller does. Hu, Shi
and Wu (2013) nd in a parallel setting that the seller prefers the sequential mechanism,
because it encourages consumer participation by removing their uncertainty in period 2,
which leads to higher group formation rates. Interestingly, in our case the seller, who
aims to maximize prot, may instead prefer the simultaneous format. This is because
the simultaneous format does not remove uncertainty to the high-value consumers, which
facilitates price discrimination by discouraging them from obtaining the bundle discount.
In addition to o¤ering a new perspective on product bundling, this paper is also closely
related to the literature on pricing under demand uncertainty. In Dana (1999, 2001), for
example, demand can be either high or low. He nds that a monopolist optimally o¤ers
two prices, with only a limited quantity o¤ered under a low price, which is set for the low
demand state. A high price then allows the rm to extract additional consumer surplus when
demand turns out to be high, in which case the limited quantity available at the low price
will sell out so that some high-priced units will be purchased. Anand and Aron (2003), in
an early study of web-based group buying, also consider a model with either a high or a low
demand regime, represented by two linear demand functions. They demonstrate that group
buying may enable the seller to set price-quantity schedules that optimize revenue under
each demand regime, and that the protability of group buying relative to posted pricing
depends on whether the two linear demand functions are parallel or intersecting.8 Our paper
departs from this literature by adopting a di¤erent analytical approach, capturing the group
8Also related are Gale and Holmes (1992, 1993), who study how a monopolist may use advance purchase
discounts to allocate capacity more e¢ ciently in the presence of demand uncertainty. See also Dana (1998)
for a related analysis in competitive markets.
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buying problem in a general bundling framework. One clear advantage of this approach is
that it enables us to analyze group-discount schemes with minimum or maximum group sizes
in a unied model and to uncover the interesting relations between them. Additionally, we
are concerned with the uncertainty of a di¤erent nature: there are both high- and low-
value consumers, and the uncertainty is over their respective numbers. We believe that this
captures plausible market environments faced by many rms, complementary to the settings
studied in other papers in this literature. Furthermore, our analysis leads to interesting new
results on the protability and optimal design of interpersonal bundling. Our paper thus
contributes to the literatures on product bundling, on pricing under demand uncertainty,
and, more generally, on the economics and management of marketing.
In the rest of the paper, we establish the two general properties of interpersonal bundling
in section 2, and analyze in more detail its two simple forms, IBmin and IBmax, in sec-
tion 3. Section 4 explores the optimal design of IBmin incorporating additional strategic
considerations of information dissemination and price discrimination. Section 5 concludes.
2. DEMAND UNCERTAINTY AND INTERPERSONAL BUNDLING
2.1 The Model
A monopolist o¤ers a product for sale. There are two types of consumers, high-value
and low-value, whose product valuations are respectively H and L; with H > L > 0: A
consumers type is her private information, and each consumer desires to purchase at most
one unit. The numbers of low- and high-value consumers (denoted as L-consumers and
H-consumers) are respectively x and y; which are realizations of random variables X and Y
that have joint distribution function G (x; y) on support [ax; bx][ay; by] ; where 0  ax < bx
and 0  ay  by: The marginal distribution functions of X and Y are Fx (x) and Fy (y) ;
respectively: Production cost is normalized to zero, and the rm maximizes expected prot.
Let x and y be the expected number of L- and H-consumers, respectively. Then
x =
Z bx
ax
xdFx (x) ; y =
Z by
ay
ydFy (y) : (1)
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We allow the possibility that either y = y is a constant or x = x is a constant; in which
case G (x; y) degenerates to Fx (x) or Fy (y) :9
As a benchmark, consider the case of separate selling where the rm posts a single unit
price to all consumers. Then, prot is higher under p = H if Hy > L (x+ y) and under
p = L if Hy < L (x+ y) : It follows that the optimal price and the corresponding prot are,
respectively:10
ps =
8<: H if x 
 
H
L   1

y
L if x >
 
H
L   1

y
; s =
8<: Hy if x 
 
H
L   1

y
L (x+ y) if x >
 
H
L   1

y
: (2)
Therefore, if the expected number of L-consumers (x) is small, the rm will only sell to the
H-consumers at ps = H; otherwise, it will sell to all consumers at ps = L.
Under interpersonal bundling (IB), the rm sets a stand-alone unit price p; a discounted
unit price under group purchase q  p; and a condition that the group discount becomes ef-
fective if and only if the number of consumers belongs to the setB  f[mi;Mi] : i = 1; :::; ng
for some integer n; with 0  mi Mi <1.11 An example of B with two intervals (n = 2)
is B = f[0; 1] ; [2; 3]g : IB may also contain a bundle with a single interval, B = [m;M ] ;
which further nests two special cases: (1) IB with a minimum group size, or IBmin: (p; q;m) ;
where each consumer can separately purchase the good at price p; but consumers who sign
up for group purchase can buy at the discounted price q if and only if there are at least m
consumers in the group: (2) IB with a maximum group size, or IBmax: (p; q;M) ; where
consumers who sign up for group purchase can buy at the discounted price q if and only if
the group size does not exceed M:
Except for Subsection 4.2, we assume that there is no transaction cost to join group
9At least one of X and Y is not a constant. We also allow X or Y to be discrete random variables, in
which case ax and bx or ay and by correspond respectively to the smallest and largest values that can be
realized.
10For ease of exposition, when prot is the same under p = H and p = L; we assume ps = H:
11When G (x; y) is not continuous, some inequalities in the bundle size conditions mi  Bi  Mi may
be strict. More generally, IB can take the form of a general bundling menu f(pi; Bi)g ; where consumers
in bundle size Bi are charged with price pi: In our simple context, we use our equivalent formulation for
notational convenience.
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purchase, which implies that if q < p, all consumers will attempt to purchase at q.
2.2 Protability of Interpersonal Bundling
We rst demonstrate that a simple form of IB, with p = H; q = L; and some B containing
at most two intervals; is generally more protable than separate selling under demand
uncertainty.
Given (p; q; B) ; all consumers will purchase at price q if x + y 2 B and q  L; whereas
when x + y 2 B only H-consumers will purchase at price p if L < p  H; where B is the
complement of set B: The rms problem is to maximize (expected) prot:
max
qL<pH;B
 (p; q; B) = q
Z Z
B
(x+ y) dG (x; y) + p
Z Z
B
ydG (x; y) : (3)
Since  (p; q; B) weakly increases in p and q for any B; the optimal p and q that maximize
 (p; q; B) are p = H and q = L: Hence the rms maximum prot under IB and the
optimal B are:
  max
B
 (H;L;B) ; B = arg max
B
 (H;L;B) : (4)
Since  (H;L;B) = L (x+ y) if B = [ax + ay; bx + by] and  (H;L;B) = Hy if B =
(bx + by;1) ; we have   s: Thus, same as mixed bundling, IB will always be at least as
protable as separate selling.
The sellers problem can be written as maximizing
 (H;L;B) = L
Z Z
x+y2B
(x+ y) dG (x; y) +H
Z Z
x+y2 B
ydG (x; y)
=
Z Z
x+y2B
[L (x+ y) Hy] dG (x; y) +Hy
= L (x+ y) +
Z Z
x+y2 B
[Hy   L (x+ y)] dG (x; y) :
Our result below will assume a regularity condition on uncertainty: there exist (small)
intervals 1 and 2 on [ax + ay; bx + by] ; where i can be a single number if G (x; y) is not
continuous, such that
Pr

x+ y >
H
L
y
x+ y 2 1 = 1; Prx+ y < HL y
x+ y 2 2 = 1: (5)
7
That is, conditional on x+y belonging to 1; x+y > HL y; and conditional on x+y belonging
to 2; x+ y < HL y: This assumption rules out trivial cases where x+ y is always higher or
lower than HL y for (almost) all possible realizations of (x; y) ; in which case under separate
selling the optimal price will be independent of the realization of (x; y) : As it will become
clear later, condition (5) holds quite generally; in fact, if it is not satised, then separate
selling will always be an optimal selling scheme (see the argument immediately following
(14) in the next subsection), and the resolution of demand uncertainty will not a¤ect the
choice of ps.
Proposition 1 Under (5), interpersonal bundling (H;L;B0) ; with B0 containing at most
two intervals, is more protable than separate selling.
Proof. Since under separate selling s = max fHy; L (x+ y)g ; we show that there is some
B0 such that  (H;L;B0) > s whether s = Hy or s = L (x+ y) ; and B0 contains at
most two intervals.
Suppose that s = Hy: Then, let B0 = 1; we have,
    H;L;B0 = Z Z
x+y21
[L (x+ y) Hy] dG (x; y) +Hy > H y:
(The rst inequality above is due to revealed preference, and the second to the denition
of 1; which is a single interval and could be a single number if it is a mass point.)
Next, suppose instead that s = L (x+ y) : Then, let B0 = 2; which contains two
intervals, with B0 = 2: We then have
    H;L;B0 = L (x+ y) + Z Z
x+y2 B0
[Hy   L (x+ y)] dG (x; y)
= L (x+ y) +
Z Z
x+y22
[Hy   L (x+ y)] dG (x; y) > L (x+ y) :
The reason for the protability of IB is simple. With uncertain demand, the optimal
uniform price depends on the realization of the numbers of H- and L-consumers. Under
separate selling, the rm chooses the price that is only optimal on average. When ps = H;
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the L-consumers are not served, and adding a discounted price L that becomes e¤ective only
if the realized consumer group size corresponds to a region where ps = L; which is ensured
by the construction of bundle B0, leads to a higher expected prot than separate selling
under ps = H: Similarly, when ps = L; prot can be increased by also o¤ering a higher
regular price H that becomes e¤ective only if the realized consumer group size corresponds
to a region where prot is higher under ps = H: Thus, IB implements protable option
pricing under demand uncertainty, boosting prot.
Notice that for IB to dominate separate selling with ps = H, the bundle size is only
required to satisfy x+y 2 1; i.e., m  x+y M for some m M ; and for IB to dominate
ps = L, the bundle size is only required to satisfy x+ y 2 2; i.e., x+ y  m or x+ y M
for some m M: Therefore a protable bundle B0 contains at most two intervals. However,
B0 may not be the optimal bundle. IB with a more general B can potentially achieve higher
prot. In fact, as we show next, IB with a general bundle menu B is an optimal selling
scheme if a plausible su¢ cient condition is satised.
2.3 Interpersonal Bundling as an Optimal Selling Mechanism
This subsection demonstrates that IB (H;L;B) ; with B = f[mi ;Mi ] : i = 1; :::; ng ; is
an optimal selling mechanism under the following su¢ cient condition (explained shortly):
(x; y) : x+ y >
H
L
y

= 
;

(x; y) : x+ y  H
L
y

= 
; (6)
where

  [ni=1 f(x; y) : mi  x+ y Mi g :
We prove this by rst characterizing the sellers highest possible prot under its information
constraint, using a general mechanism design approach. We then show that optimal IB
achieves this (constrained) rst best under (6).
Since all consumers are ex ante the same, we can consider mechanisms for a representative
consumer. From the revelation principle, we can limit our search for an optimal selling
scheme to direct mechanisms where the consumer is asked to report her type  2 fH; Lg ;
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who will receive a unit of the good with probability  () by paying p () ; 12 and truth
reporting is optimal for the consumer. Given that there is a continuum of consumers,  ()
and p () will depend on  and on some aggregate measure(s) of consumers. For the rst
best, we assume that a mechanism may depend on the realized total demand from each of
the two types of consumers, x and y:13 Then, a mechanism species f (;x; y) ; p (;x; y)g :
The seller chooses f (;x; y) ; p (;x; y)g to maximize
 =
Z Z
[xp (L;x; y) (L;x; y) + yp (H;x; y) (H;x; y)] dG (x; y) ; (7)
subject to individual rationality constraints
(L  p (L;x; y)) (L;x; y)  0; (8)
(H   p (H;x; y)) (H;x; y)  0; (9)
and incentive compatibility constraints
(L  p (L;x; y)) (L;x; y)  (L  p (H;x; y)) (H;x; y) ; (10)
(H   p (H;x; y)) (H;x; y)  (H   p (L;x; y)) (L;x; y) : (11)
From standard arguments, p (L;x; y) = L so that the L-type receives no information rents,
and (10) holds with p (H;x; y)  L: From (11), which holds in equality at the optimum,
and with p (L;x; y) = L; we have
p (H;x; y) (H;x; y) = H (H;x; y)  (H   L) (L;x; y) : (12)
Thus (9) and (12) are the two remaining constraints. Substituting (12) into (7), with
p (L;x; y) = L; we obtain
 =
Z Z
f[xL  y (H   L)] (L;x; y) + yH (H;x; y)g dG (x; y) ;
12We can also allow a transfer payment when the consumer does not receive the good, but it would be
optimal for the seller to set this payment to zero.
13 In reality, the seller may only be able to commit to prices based on aggregate demand x + y; but not
on individual values of x and y; because x and y may not be separately veriable while x+ y potentially is.
Thus the rst-best prot is only a benchmark. Remarkably, as we show next, IB can achieve this rst best
if (6) holds.
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which increases in  (H;x; y) : Since constraint (9) is not less likely satised with an increase
in ; it follows that  (H;x; y) = 1 at the optimum. Then, (9) and (12) become H 
p (H;x; y) = H   (H   L) (L;x; y) ; and the seller chooses  (L;x; y) to maximize
 =
Z Z
f(x+ y)L (L;x; y) + yH [1   (L;x; y)]g dG (x; y) ; (13)
which can be written as
 =
Z Z
[(x+ y)L  yH] (L;x; y) dG (x; y) +Hy:
Therefore, letting  (L;x; y) = 1 whenever x + y > HL y and  (L;x; y) = 0 whenever
x+ y  HL y; the highest possible prot that the seller can achieve is
 =
Z Z
x+y>H
L
y
[(x+ y)L  yH] dG (x; y) +Hy: (14)
There are two cases to consider in (14): (i) if x+y < HL y for (almost) all (x; y) ; or if x+y >
H
L y for (almost) all (x; y) ; we have 
 = Hy or L (x+ y) respectively, and hence separate
selling as a special case of IB would achieve the rst best. And (ii),

(x; y) : x+ y > HL y
	
has a positive measure and (5) holds. Then  > Hy: In either case, under condition (6),
(H;L;B) with B = f[mi ;Mi ] : i = 1; :::; ng will achieve the rst-best :
 =
Z Z
x+y2B
[(x+ y)L  yH] dG (x; y) +Hy: (15)
We summarize the above with the following:
Proposition 2 Under (6); interpersonal bundling (H;L;B) with B = f[mi ;Mi ] : i = 1; :::; ng
is an optimal selling scheme.
As (14) suggests, the highest possible prot for the seller is equal to Hy; the expected
prot under uniform price H, plus an additional term that reects the expected increase in
prot if the price could be lowered to sell also to L-consumers when the demand realization
is such that doing so would raise prot; i.e., when (x; y) 2 (x; y) : x+ y > HL y	. Under
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a general interpersonal bundling scheme, the idea is to divide this set into regions corre-
sponding to intervals of x+ y: With bundle sizes designed to match these intervals, IB can
achieve the rst-best prot, as in (15), and it is therefore an optimal selling scheme.14
Propositions 1 and 2 are complementary to each other. Proposition 2 shows that IB is an
optimal selling method under (6), but it may not dominate separate selling, which is a special
case of IB, and the optimal bundle might be rather complicated. By contrast, Proposition
1 shows that a simple form of IB is more protable than separate selling, provided that the
regularity condition is satised, but it does not address the issue of whether IB is an optimal
selling scheme. Together, they imply that IB dominates separate selling and achieves the
highest possible prot when (5) and (6) are both satised.
While Propositions 1 and 2 shed light on the properties of IB in general, it is not explicit
how they relate to the parameter values of the model and to observed marketing practices.
We next turn to simpler forms of IB that have been or can potentially be used relatively
easily in practice, to gain insights on when the conditions for these results are satised and
how to design IB in di¤erent market environments.
3. IB WITH A MINIMUM OR MAXIMUM GROUP SIZE
In this section, we discuss two especially simple forms of interpersonal bundling, IBmin
and IBmax. One motivation for the study of IBmin is that it is a widely observed selling
practice, popularized especially on the Internet by Groupon. After studying IBmin, we
also examine IBmax As it turns out, the protability condition for IBmax is interestingly
connected to that for IBmin.
14Condition (6) is needed, essentially because the rst-best mechanism can depend separately on x and
y; while IB can only condition prices on x + y: With (6), information about x + y is su¢ cient for the
implementation of the rst best. Notice that if

(x; y) : x+ y > H
L
y
	
is empty, (6) obviously holds with
i = 1 and m1 = M1: In general, while (6) holds naturally in many situations (as we illustrate later), it need
not always be true.
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3.1 Prot Advantages of IBmin
Notice that IBmin (p; q;m) is equivalent to ps = q if m  ax + ay; and to ps = p if
m > bx + by: Thus IBmin is always at least as protable as separate selling. To investigate
when IBmin is more protable than separate selling and how large its prot advantage is,
we note that, from (3) and (4), under IBmin the seller maximizes:
max
m
 (H;L;m) = L
Z Z
x+ym
(x+ y) dG (x; y) +H
Z Z
x+y<m
ydG (x; y) : (16)
Let  now be the highest prot under IBmin. Condition (A1) below provides a su¢ cient
condition for  > s: 
1 +
ax
ay

<
H
L
<

1 +
bx
by

: (A1)
Proposition 3 IBmin (H;L;m) is more protable than separate selling if (A1) holds.
Proof. From (A1), Hby < L (bx + by) : Thus there exists "1  12
 
bx + by   HL by

> 0 such
that bx + by   "1 > HL by: Hence, if x+ y 2 1 = [bx + by   "1; bx + by] ; x+ y > HL by  HL y:
It follows that
Pr

x+ y >
H
L
y
x+ y 2 1 = 1:
Also from (A1), Hay > L (ax + ay) : Thus there exist "2  12

H
L ay   (ax + ay)

> 0 such
that ax + ay + "2 < HL ay: Hence, if x+ y 2 2 = [ax + ay; ax + ay + "2] ; x+ y < HL ay  HL y:
It follows that
Pr

x+ y <
H
L
y
x+ y 2 2 = 1:
Therefore, condition (5) is satised, and hence IBmin is more protable than separate selling
from Proposition 1.
Intuitively, under (A1), if ps = H; prot can be increased by keeping the regular price
but adding a group bundle with unit price L and a minimum size that is slightly lower
than bx + by (the maximum possible total number of consumers); if ps = L; prot can be
increased by rasing the regular price to H and adding a bundle with unit price L and a
minimum size that is slightly higher than ax + ay (the minimum possible total number of
consumers). (A1), which is su¢ cient but not necessary for (5), ensures that these changes
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will indeed strictly increase prot. Condition (A1) is thus invariant to the functional form
of the joint distribution of X and Y; depending only on the upper and lower limits of the
support for the distribution: It holds if the H=L ratio is relatively large compared to ax=ay
but small compared to bx=by. IBmin allows the rm to sell at the low price only if prot is
higher under the low price otherwise the high price will prevail thereby assuring a higher
prot than separate selling.15
In many situations where group coupons are issued by sellers such as restaurants and hair
salons, H could be considered as the regular price at which the seller has less uncertainty
about the number of consumers. Thus the di¤erence between ay and by tends to be relatively
small: On the other hand, there might be more uncertainty about the number of consumers
who will purchase at the sale price L; so the di¤erence between ax and bx tends to be
relatively large. In such situations, condition (A1) is likely satised.16
To illustrate and to make explicit prot comparisons, consider the example below:
Example 1 Suppose that X and Y are independently and uniformly distributed on [0; 3]
and [1; 2] ; respectively: Then, x = y = 32 ; p
s = H if H  2L; ps = L if H < 2L; and (A1)
holds if H < 52L: Under IBmin,
 (H;L;m)  L
Z 2
maxf1;m 3g
Z 3
maxfm y;0g
(x+ y)
1
3
dxdy+H
Z minfm;2g
1
Z minfm y;3g
0
y
1
3
dxdy:
Setting @ (H;L;m) =@m = 0; we nd the optimal minimum bundle size as
m =
8>>><>>>:
H
2L H ; with 
 > s if H  43L
3
2
H
L ; with 
 > s if 43L < H < 2:6L
 5; with  = s if 2:6L  H
:
For instance, if L = 1 and H = 2; then m = 3 and  = 3: 3333 > s = 3; so IBmin
increases (expected) prot by about 11%:
15 If H=L is too small, it may be optimal always to sell at ps = L; so the option to sell at alternative prices
has no value. Likewise, if H=L is too large, it could be optimal always to sell at ps = H; which would then
achieve the same prot as interpersonal bundling.
16We may view IBmin as allowing the seller to experiment with a lower price that will prevail only when
the number of purchasing consumers reaches a minimum size, or only when it is more protable than the
regular price.
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Several observations can be made in Example 1. First, condition (A1) is su¢ cient, but
not necessary, for the protability of IBmin. In Example 1, while (A1) holds for H < 2:5L;
IBmin is also protable when H 2 [2:5L; 2:6L):
Second, (A1) is fairly tight as a su¢ cient condition. When H  2:6L; IBmin is no longer
protable. In this case, 32
H
L  32 (2:6) = 3: 9: However, for any m 2 [3: 9; 5); the expected
prot under x+ y  m; in which case all sales will occur at the discounted price L; is lower
than the expected prot under separate selling. Therefore, it is optimal for the seller not
to o¤er the bundle, which is equivalent to setting a su¢ ciently large bundle size (m  5).
Third, when IBmin is protable, m increases in H but decreases in L: A marginal
increase in m reduces the probability that the sale will occur at the low price (with a large
volume) and raises the probability that the sale will occur at the high price. Thus, m;
which balances these two e¤ects, increases with the high price and decreases with the low
price.
We now turn to the question of how the advantage of IBmin, relative to separate selling,
may vary with the market environment. We rst consider how the ratio H=L; or the
di¤erence between the reservation prices of the high- and low-value consumers, a¤ects the
relative protability of bundling.
Corollary 1 Suppose that (A1) holds and L is xed. Then,   s exhibits an inverted-U
shape with respect to changes in H; rst increasing and then decreasing, reaching maximum
at H =

1 + xy

L:
Proof. When H <

1 + xy

L;    s = maxm  (H;L;m)   L (x+ y) : From (16),
 (H;L;m) increases inH for all interiorm: Thus, if (A1) holds so that  > s,maxm  (H;L;m)
is also increasing in H; and so is    s: Similarly, when H 

1 + xy

L;    s =
maxm
R R
x+ym [L (x+ y) Hy] dG (x; y) ; which decreases in H.
When H=L is low (or high), the prot advantage of IBmin is low relative to separate
selling, because selling at price L (or H) is often more protable than at price H (or L);
which implies that the option to sell at one of the two prices contingent on the realizations
of X + Y under IBmin has very limited value. This option becomes more valuable when
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H=L is at some intermediate level, implying more profound prot advantage of IBmin.17
We next consider how the dispersion of X a¤ects the prots under IBmin. Intuitively,
when X is more dispersed, demand is more uncertain and the advantage of IBmin is larger.
The result below shows that this is indeed the case under some conditions, assuming that X
and Y are independent with the (marginal) distribution of Y being Fy (y) ; and comparing
prots under two di¤erent distributions of X:
Following Johnson and Myatt (2006), we say that distribution F^x (x) is more dispersed
than Fx (x) if F^x (x) is a rotation of Fx (x) such that x ? x^ () F^x (x) 7 Fx (x) for some
rotation point x^: Under F^x (x) and Fx (x) ; respectively, let xF^ and xF be the expected
values of X; b^x and bx the upper limits of F^x and Fx; and m^ and m the optimal bundle
sizes, where b^x  bx and xF^  xF . Let the corresponding prots be ^ and  under
bundling; and ^s and s under separate selling.
Corollary 2 Suppose (A1) holds and F^x is a rotation of Fx such that: (i) Hy  L
 
y + xF^

;
(ii) x^  m   by; and (iii)
R by
ay
[Lm  Hy]
h
F^x (m
   y)  Fx (m   y)
i
dFy (y)  0: Then,
^  ^s >  s; that is, the prot advantage of IBmin relative to separate selling is larger
if X is more dispersed.
Proof. See the appendix.
Although the result seems intuitive, the comparison of prots under F^x (x) and Fx (x)
turns out to be subtle. Condition (i) ensures that ps = H under separate selling for both
F^x (x) and Fx (x) : Under (ii), F^x (x) < Fx (x) for x  m y; so that more dispersion under
F^x leads to higher probabilities for higher realizations of x; and under (iii) this similarly
holds on average weighted by the density of Y: All three conditions can be easy to verify.
For instance, in Example 1, where Fx (x) = x3 ; these conditions are satised for any rotation
F^x (x) =
x
 with  > 3 and H=L 2 [(3 + ) =3; 2.6); where m = 32 HL > 3 > by = 2; and
x^ = 0.
17We have also considered a variant of our model in which the reservation prices of the two types of
consumers are random variables instead of constant values, with similar insights on the protability of
IBmin. The assumption that the reservation prices take constant values H and L allows us to illustrate our
ideas most transparently.
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3.2 Protability of IBmax and the Nature of Uncertainty
We now study IBmax, (p; q;M) ; which also weakly dominates separate selling, since it
is equivalent to ps = q if M > bx + by and to ps = p if M  ax + ay: We rst establish
the protability of IBmax and its prot advantage relative to separate selling, in parallel to
and in comparison with the analysis for IBmin. We then discuss limited-quantity discount
(LQD), which is closely related to IBmax, and comment on how to implement IBmax.
From (3) and (4), under IBmax the seller maximizes:
max
M
 (H;L;M) = L
Z Z
x+yM
(x+ y) dG (x; y) +H
Z Z
x+y>M
ydG (x; y) : (17)
Let  now be the highest prot under IBmax. As another application of Proposition 1,
Condition (A1) below provides a su¢ cient condition for  > s:

1 +
bx
by

<
H
L
<

1 +
ax
ay

: (A1)
Proposition 4 IBmax is more protable than separate selling if (A1) holds.
Proof. From (A1), Hay < L (ax + ay) : Thus there exists "1  12
 
ax + ay   HL ay

> 0 such
that ax+ay "1 > HL ay: Hence, if x+y 2 1 =

ax + ay; ax + ay +
L
H "1

; then y  ay+ LH "1
and
x+ y  ax + ay > H
L
ay + "1  H
L

y   L
H
"1

+ "1 =
H
L
y:
It follows that
Pr

x+ y >
H
L
y
x+ y 2 1 = 1:
Also from (A1), Hby > L (bx + by) : Thus there exists "2  12

H
L by   (bx + by)

> 0 such
that bx + by + "2 < HL by: Hence, if x+ y 2 2 =

bx + by   LH "2; bx + by

; then y  by   LH "2
and
x+ y  bx + by < H
L
by   "2  H
L

y +
L
H
"2

  "2 = H
L
y:
It follows that
Pr

x+ y <
H
L
y
x+ y 2 2 = 1:
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Therefore, condition (5) is satised, and hence IBmax dominates separate selling from
Proposition 1.
Note that (A1) is more likely to hold if ay is small relative to ax and by is large relative
to bx; that is, if Y is more dispersed than X:When the number of high-value consumers (y)
tends to be either much lower or much higher than the number of low-value consumers (x),
the seller wishes to set a low price to sell to all consumers if y turns to be low, but a high
price to sell only to the high-value consumers if y turns out to be high. By specifying that
the low price becomes e¤ective only when the consumer group does not exceed a certain
size, the seller can implement protable option pricing, charging a low price when demand
is low and a high price when demand is high.
By contrast, the su¢ cient condition for IBmin to dominate separate selling, (A1), is more
likely to hold if ay is large relative to ax and by is small relative to bx; that is, if X is more
dispersed than Y: Thus IBmax and IBmin are protable selling schemes in response to
demand uncertainties of a di¤erent nature. IBmin tends to be protable when the total
number of consumers and their (average) valuation are likely negatively correlated: a higher
number of consumers is likely associated with more low-value consumers; IBmax tends to
be protable when the total number of consumers and their (average) valuation are likely
positively correlated: a higher number of consumers is likely associated with more high-value
consumers.18
Moreover, for xed L; it is straightforward to show that the prot advantage of IBmax
(relative to separate selling) is an inverted-U function of H; reaching maximum at H =
1 + xy

L; similar to that of IBmin: It can also be veried that this prot advantage is
more pronounced if Fy is more dispersed, similar to the larger prot advantage of IBmin
when Fx is more dispersed. Hence, there is a version of Corollary 1 and of Corollary 2 for
IBmax, and we omit their formal statements to avoid repetition.
We next further show that IBmin or IBmax is in fact an optimal selling scheme, if there
18 IB may not be protable if neither (A1) nor (A1) is satised. For example, if L = 1; H = 2; and
(X;Y ) = (1; 10) or (2; 12) with equal probability, then ps = 2 and s = 22; which cannot be improved
through IB.
18
exists either m orM with one of the following monotonic properties on the entire support
of (x; y):
(C1) x+ y  m if and only if x+ y  H
L
y; or
(C2) x+ y  M if and only if x+ y  H
L
y;
where the inequalities may be strict if m or M is a mass point, and m (or M) is in the
interior of [ax + bx; ay + by] if it is not a mass point.
Condition (C1) holds, for example, if y is a constant, in which case m = x + y for
x  y  HL   1 : Obviously, (C1) can also hold if y is not a constant. For example, suppose
L = 10; H = 12; and (X;Y ) takes either (0, 50) or (100, 0) with equal probability. Then
(C1) holds with strict inequality and m = 50:
Condition (C2) holds, for example, if x is a constant, in which case M = x + y for
y  x=  HL   1 : For an example where x is not a constant, suppose L = 10; H = 12;
and (X;Y ) takes either (0,100) or (50, 0) with equal probability. Then (C2) holds with
M = 50:
Note that condition (5), under which IB dominates separate selling, and condition (6),
under which IB is an optimal selling mechanism, are both satised when either (C1) or (C2)
holds. Therefore, from Propositions 1 and 2, we have:
Corollary 3 (1) Under (C1), IBmin dominates separate selling and also achieves the rst-
best prot. (2) Under (C2), IBmax dominates separate selling and also achieves the rst-best
prot.
In general, however, neither (C1) nor (C2) is necessarily satised. For example, suppose
(X;Y ) can take three possible pairs of values with equal probability: (2; 0) ; (3; 3) ; and
(10; 4) ; with L = 1 and H = 2: Then, on the support of (x; y): x+ y  HL y if x+ y  2 or
if x + y  14; but x + y < HL y if 2 < x + y < 14: Nevertheless, Propositions 1 and 2 both
still apply here: bundle (2; 1; B0), with B0 = f[0; 2] ; [14; 15]g ; dominates separate selling
and also achieves the rst-best prot.
19
While IBmin has been used in the sale of many goods, IBmax does not appear common.
But a related format of IBmax, limited-quantity discount (LQD), has been used in many
markets. LQD sets a low price for a limited quantity and raises the price for the additional
quantity exceeding the limit. This is a popular selling strategy by airlines, hotels, stadiums,
theaters, and even department stores, as discussed and analyzed in Dana (1999, 2001).19
Dana (2001; page 650) gives the following example:
Suppose that demand will be either high or low, each with probability 1/2. Low demand
consists of 50 consumers with a reservation value of $10, and high demand consists of 100
consumers with a reservation value of $12. The seller must set its prices in advance. Within
his context, the following is an optimal selling strategy under zero marginal cost: print 50
tickets at a price of $10 and 50 tickets at a price of $12. This yields an expected prot of
$800, higher than $750, the highest expected prot under a uniform price.
With IBmax, however, the seller can do even better in this example. Reformulating the
example with the notations of our model, we have L = 10, H = 12 and (X;Y ) takes either
(50,0) or (0,100) with equal probability. IBmax with regular price 12; discounted price 10;
and maximum group size M = 50 leads to an expected prot of $850: The seller o¤ers
IBmax (12; 10; 50) to all consumers for simultaneous sign up. If the demand state is low,
at most 50 consumers will sign up for group purchase and will all receive the discount price
$10. If the demand state turns out to be high, more than 50 consumers will sign up, in
which case the price becomes 12, and all 100 consumers pay the higher price.
Intuitively, when the group size exceeds the maximum limit M , under LQD the low price
is still e¤ective for units up to M: If many of those who would purchase M units at the
low price, when x + y > M; are high-value consumers (in the above example all of them
are), the seller can do better with IBmax by making the low price unavailable if the group
size exceeds M . On the other hand, if those who would purchase M units at the low price,
when x+ y > M; are mostly low-value consumers, LQD can potentially be more protable.
19Denote the prot under LQD by ~ (p; q;M) ; where M is the limited quantity to which the lower price
q applies. In our context, since ~ (H;L; 0) = Hy and ~ (H;L; bx + by) = L (x+ y) ; LQD is at least as
protable as separate selling, and can often be more protable.
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One possible reason why LQD has seen wide applications but IBmax has not is that
it is more di¢ cult for a seller to commit to IBmax and to communicate it to potential
buyers. However, IBmax does not seem much more di¢ cult to implement than IBmin.
For instance, a seller could announce in advance a sale price L that is e¤ective only if
the number of orders it receives does not exceed M for a certain time period; and if it
exceeds M; all of those who still wish to purchase the good will need to pay the regular
price H: The announcement can be made through some intermediary such as Groupon or
Amazon, and the number of orders received will be kept condential until the time period
expires (so that consumers essentially submit orders simultaneously). The goods could be
theater or sports tickets, vacation packages, restaurant meals, consumer electronics, and so
on. Thus, we believe that IBmax, like many other marketing innovations, will potentially
nd its protable applications in the marketplace after it is conceived by researchers and
understood by practitioners.
4. INFORMATION DISSEMINATION AND PRICE DISCRIMINATION
Our main model has focused on the role of demand uncertainty in the protability of
interpersonal bundling. Demand uncertainty is a common phenomenon in many markets,
and our analysis demonstrates how rms can use this selling strategy to increase prot in
such market environments. In this section, we discuss how a seller may incorporate two
additional strategic considerations in the design of IB to enhance its protability, in two
variants of the main model. We shall devote our attention to IBmin, due to its high relevance
to the applications we have in mind, and also for the sake of keeping the discussions concise.
4.1 Dissemination of Product Information
The existence of a sellers product may be known to some consumers but unknown to
others. In order to achieve the group size to qualify for the low bundle price under IBmin,
an informed potential buyer may have the incentive to transmit the sale information to
other consumers. A seller should take this incentive into account in its bundle design.
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To formalize this idea in a simple setting, we consider a variant of the main model by
assuming that the number of H-consumers is initially a given number n  1; and each of
them (i = 1; :::; n) can make an e¤ort in order to inform a set of k > 0 H-consumers who
are initially unaware of the sellers product and prices.20 Dene set N  fi : i = 1; :::; ng :
Each i 2 N succeeds in transmitting the information to the k uninformed consumers with
probability i at a personal cost C (i) ; where C
0 () > 0 with C 0 (0) ! 0; C 00 ()  0; and
the k uninformed consumers become informed if at least one i 2 N succeeds. Thus, the
number of H-consumers is potentially
y =
8<: n+ k with probability 1 ni=1 (1  i)n with probability ni=1 (1  i) :
Other aspects of the model are the same as in Section 2. In particular, all L-consumers are
informed about the sellers product and price(s), and their number, x; is the realization of
random variable X that has distribution F (x) : (We drop the subscript x in F (x) for this
section.) Under separate selling, informed consumers have no incentive to incur the cost
to transmit product information. Hence ps = L and s = L (n+ x) if L (n+ x) > Hn;
whereas ps = H and s = Hn if L (n+ x)  Hn:
Under IBmin, the seller rst posts (p; q;m) ; after which all i 2 N simultaneously choose
i: Both x and y are then realized, and possible purchases are made. For convenience, we
again treat m as a continuous number, and without loss of generality, we can conne our
search for the optimal (p; q;m) to q  L < p  H:
We consider a symmetric equilibrium where each i 2 N chooses the same : Given
(p; q;m) ; and all other H-consumerschoice ; i chooses her i to maximize her expected
surplus:
U (ijm;) = (H   q)Pr (X + Y  m) + (H   p)Pr (X + Y < m)  C (i) ;
20Unlike in Section 2, the number of initial H-consumers is now an integer. This avoids the problem that
no consumer is willing to incur the information transmission cost when the number is a continuum: For
convenience, we assume that the initially uninformed consumers also are all of the H-type.
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where Pr(X + Y  m) =
[1  F (m  n  k)]
h
1  (1  )n 1 (1  i)
i
+ (1  F (m  n)) (1  )n 1 (1  i) :
To see the trade-o¤ for i in choosing optimal i; notice that the optimal i satises
@U (ijm;) =@iji= = 0 in a symmetric equilibrium, which, denoting the equilibrium 
by    (p; q;m) for any given (p; q;m), becomes:
(p  q) [F (m  n)  F (m  n  k)] (1  )n 1   C 0 () = 0; (18)
where [F (m  n)  F (m  n  k)] is the increased probability of meeting m due to the
addition of k uninformed consumers and (1  )n 1 is the probability that other (n  1)
H-type informed consumers fail to reach the uninformed. Thus, as n goes to innitive, 
approaches zero because of the free riding problem. If n is nite, however, rearranging the
above equation gives
(p  q) [F (m  n)  F (m  n  k)] = C
0 ()
(1  )n 1 :
Thus, for a nite xed n, the equilibrium  =  (p; q;m) is positive and increases in (p  q)
because C 00 > 0: The choice of  balances the marginal benet of increasing the probability
of meeting the bundle size m and the marginal e¤ort cost of disseminating information.
Holding other things constant, the bundle discount (p  q) has to increase with n if the
seller wishes to induce the same amount of e¤ort from the informed consumers. Hence,
the rms ability to use IBmin as an information dissemination device will be more limited
when n becomes larger.
Anticipating  (p; q;m) in equilibrium, the seller will choose the equilibrium bundle
(p; q;m) ; and the equilibrium  is then  =  (p; q;m) : In setting (p; q;m) ; the
seller knows that IBmin now can increase prot for two distinct reasons. First, as a prof-
itable pricing strategy under uncertainty, it increases prot even if i = 0 for all i (in which
case uninformed consumers do not learn about the product information). From Proposition
3 and (A1), this is ensured if 
1 +
ax
n

<
H
L
<

1 +
bx
n

: (A2)
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Second, IBmin can motivate consumers to transmit product information to the unin-
formed, or to choose i > 0 at a personal cost. In choosing m
 to provide this incentive, the
seller balances two opposing e¤ects: while a higher m motivates the informed consumers to
disseminate information, it may also diminish this incentive if the threshold is set too high.
Our next result, which provides a su¢ cient condition for higher prot under IBmin with
the additional channel of encouraging information transmission to expand demand (i.e., in
equilibrium i = 
 > 0), refers to the following condition:

1 +
ax
n

<
H
L


1 +
bx
n+ k

: (A2)
Note that (A2), which implies the weaker condition (A2), similarly holds if H=L is in an
intermediate range.
Proposition 5 Suppose that (A2) holds. Then, IBmin has higher prot than separate
selling with  > 0; p = H; and m 2 (n+ ax; n+ k + bx) :
Proof. See the appendix.
Since the discount price can be valid only if m is reached, the informed consumers
have the incentive to transmit costly product information to the uninformed, hoping that
more consumers will join the group purchase. As is shown in the proof for the symmetric
equilibrium contained in the appendix, it is indeed optimal for each informed consumer
to choose ; given that other informed consumers will do the same, and there exists an
interior minimum size m. It is worth emphasizing that the optimal m is now chosen also
to provide the incentive for , in addition to responding optimally to demand uncertainty.
In other words, IBmin also provides a mechanism to expand market demand.
To illustrate, consider the next example:
Example 2 Suppose that n = 2; k = 1; C (i) =
1
2
2
i ; F (x) =
x
3 for x 2 [0; 3] ; and
L < H < 52L: Then, condition (A2) is satised, which is su¢ cient for IBmin to increase
prot. With L = 1; Table 1 below lists the equilibrium bundle and the prot comparisons
with separate selling.
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Table 1
p q m   s 
 s
s
H = 2 2 1 4: 875 0:25 4: 805 4 10%
H = 1:8 1:8 1 4: 278 0:21 4: 377 3:6 22%
H = 1:5 1:5 1 3:398 0:143 3:914 3:5 12%
As in Example 1, given L; m is higher for higher H: Furthermore,  is also higher for
higher H; directly because of the larger bundle discount (H  L), and indirectly because of
the higher bundle size (m):
For tractability, our model of information dissemination has made some simplifying as-
sumptions. In particular, our assumption that each informed consumer can transmit sale
information to all uninformed consumers with some probability is restrictive. While it is
possible that an informed consumer can publicize the group coupon information to all un-
informed consumers through media such as facebook or an online forum, our assumption
is made mainly for the tractability of analysis. We expect that the basic insights will still
be valid in a more realistic setting where various numbers of uninformed consumers may
become informed with di¤erent probabilities.
Another of our simplifying assumptions is that the uninformed are all H-consumers. One
may wonder what would happen if some L-consumers were also in the uninformed pool.
To see this most strikingly, suppose that the uninformed are all L-consumers. Then, the
incentive for the informed H-consumers to disseminate information remains unchanged,
because both types of consumers are willing to buy at the discounted price L. However, the
rms problem would need a slight modication: if m is reached, the rm would earn prot
L (x+ n+ k) ; same as when all the uninformed have the high valuation; but if m is not
reached, the rm would earn prot Hn while the prot is H (n+ k) when all the uninformed
have the high valuation. Thus, the di¤erence when the uninformed all have the low valuation
is that the rm earns less prot if m is not reached. In response, the rm would set a
lower m compared to the case where all the uninformed are H-consumers. Nevertheless,
the rm will still nd it protable to impose a minimum bundle size to motivate consumers
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to disseminate information.21
4.2 Price Discrimination
To obtain the group discount under IB, a consumer may need to incur transaction costs
to sign up for group purchase. If H-consumers have higher time costs, they are less likely
to participate. Interpersonal bundling can thus be a device for price discrimination, as
in the textbook example of price discrimination through coupons. With IBmin, however,
there is an additional instrument to screen the buyers: Through the choice of the minimum
bundle size that may not be reached due to uncertainty, the seller can further discourage
H-consumers from attempting to receive the group discount.
To illustrate, consider another variant of the main model, where the L-consumers have
no cost to participate in group purchase, but the H-consumers incur a transaction cost t to
do so. Assume that t is distributed on [t; t] with p.d.f.  (t) > 0; c.d.f.  (t) ; and 0  t < t:
The number of L-consumers is again x with cumulative distribution function F (x) ; while
the mass of H-consumers is normalized to 1. Under separate selling, ps = H = s if
H  L (x+ 1) ; whereas ps = L and s = L (x+ 1) if H < L (x+ 1) :
As in the main model, the game under IBmin proceeds as follows: First, the seller o¤ers
(p; q;m) : Second, the number of L-consumers and the private t for each H-consumer are
realized. Third, consumers choose whether to sign up for group purchase. Fourth, the total
number of consumers who sign up becomes known. If this number exceeds m; each group
member pays q while consumers who have not signed up will pay p; otherwise, all consumers
are charged regular price p.
In order to analyze price discrimination under alternative forms of IBmin, we further
assume that consumers can sign up for group purchase possibly in two periods, 1, or 2.
(Neither the seller nor consumers discount time.) Under the simultaneous format, at the
beginning of period 2 the seller does not reveal how many consumers signed up in the rst
21The analysis can also be properly modied to deal with the more general case where the uniformed were
a mix of the two types of consumers, and  2 [0; 1] were the portion of the H-consumers in the uninformed
pool. It can be shown that the result (Proposition 5) would be qualitatively similar.
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period, whereas under the sequential format the rm does. Hence, with the former all
consumers e¤ectively make sign-up decisions simultaneously, whereas with the latter they
make sign-up decisions sequentially.
Simultaneous Format
In this case, anH-consumer, if she wishes to participate, needs to incur t before it becomes
known how many L-consumers have joined group purchase, or what the realization of x is
(it is optimal for all L-consumers to sign up for group coupon since they incur no sign-up
cost). Suppose that there is some t 2 [0; t] that solves
H   p =
Z
x+(t)m
(H   q) f (x) dx+
Z
x+(t)<m
(H   p) f (x) dx  t: (19)
Then, there will be an equilibrium where all L-consumers sign up for group purchase, and
an H-consumer will sign up if and only if t  t:22 We shall focus on this equilibrium.23
Rearranging (19), we obtain
t = (p  q) [1  F (m   (t))] : (20)
The sellers problem is, with t = t (p; q;m) ; to maximize
 (p; q;m) =
Z bx
m (t)
[q (x+  (t)) + p (1   (t))] f (x) dx+ p
Z m (t)
ax
f (x) dx (21)
subject to q  L; L  p  H; ax  m    (t)  bx: The solution to (21) denes the
equilibrium (p; q;m) :
With regular price p and discounted bundle price q, an H-consumer may nevertheless
prefer to purchase at p; because she incurs t for group purchase and she may lose t without
receiving the bundle discount if m is not reached. Hence, a higher m will reduce the
incentive of anH-consumer to engage in group purchase. IBmin may thus price discriminate
more e¤ectively both than traditional coupons and than traditional mixed bundling. A
22Equation (19) says that the marginal H-consumer with t will just be willing to sign up; given (p; q;m)
and given the equilibrium behavior of all other consumers.
23There can also be a trivial equilibrium where no one signs up for the group coupon, due to there being
a continuum of consumers.
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higher m; however, can hurt the seller if the sales to the L-consumers do not materialize.
Notice that any q below L will lower the sellers prot when the good is sold at a discount
and will also make participating in group purchase more attractive to the H-consumers.
Thus it is optimal for q = L: On the other hand, a higher p may increase the prot from
the H-consumers paying p but makes the bundle discount more attractive. Consequently,
the optimal p is determined jointly with m:
Again denote the sellers equilibrium prot under IBmin by : To derive a su¢ cient
condition under which  > s; we utilize the condition below
(i) t > H   L; (ii) H
L
< 1 +
bx
 (H   L) : (A3)
Since p  H; part (i) in (A3) ensures that some H-consumers will not incur t for the
bundle discount, and, from (21),
   (H;L; ax) = L [x+  (H   L)] +H [1   (H   L)] > L (x+ 1) = sjps=L ;
so that (p; q;m) = (H;L; ax) is always more protable than ps = L: Moreover, since t 
H   L and part (ii) in (A3) implies H (t) < L [ (t) + bx], if m = bx +  (t)   " for
small enough " > 0 (i.e., m is slightly below bx +  (t), we have, from (21):
   (H;L; bx +  (t)  ") =
Z bx
bx "
[L (x+  (t)) H (t)] f (x) dx+H

Z bx
bx "
[L (bx   "+  (t)) H (t)] f (x) dx+H > H = sjps=H ;
where the last inequality above holds because H (t) < L [bx +  (t)  "] for su¢ ciently
small ": Hence (p; q;m) = (H;L; bx +  (t)  ") is always more protable than ps = H:
Therefore, since ps = L or H; under condition (A3) it must be true that  > s and
p > L = q. We have thus established:
Proposition 6 Suppose that condition (A3) is satised. Then, the sellers prot is higher
under IBmin than under separate selling with p > L = q.
Notice that since y is normalized to 1 in this variant of the model, (A1) becomes (1 + ax) <
H=L < (1 + bx) : Hence, (A3) is less stringent than (A1), because  (H   L) < 1 for
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t > H L: IBmin dominates separate selling under broader conditions here than in the main
model, because it now may increase prot also through price discrimination. To illustrate,
suppose H=L < 1+ax: In this case, if, as in the main model, no consumer has sign-up costs,
IBmin is not protable and the rm will optimally choose ps = L. However, with positive
sign-up costs for H-consumers, IBmin becomes protable through price discrimination. In
fact, bundle (H;L; ax) ; under which m = ax is always reached but H-consumers with
t > H   L will choose not to join the group and will hence pay price H; yields a higher
prot than separate selling. (The seller may do even better by optimally choosing some m
that is di¤erent from ax.)
Sequential Format
Now consider the sequential format: Since an L-consumer has no cost to sign up, it is
optimal for her to do so in the rst period. Therefore in equilibrium all L-consumers sign
up in period 1 and their number is then publicly known.
Next consider the sign-up decision of H-consumers, for whom it is optimal to wait until
the beginning of period 2 to make the choice.24 Suppose for a moment that, in equilibrium,
depending on the realization of x, there exists a cuto¤ value t (x) such that only H-
consumers with t  t will sign up for group purchase. Given such a strategy by other
consumers, an H-consumer with sign-up cost t chooses to sign up only if this leads to a
(weakly) higher surplus for her and if a group discount is expected to be o¤ered:
H   q   t  H   p and x+  (t)  m:
Hence the marginal H-consumer has t = p   q. It follows that, if x  x^, it is optimal for
any H-consumer with t  t to sign up given that the others will do the same, where
t = p  q and x^ = m   (p  q) ; (22)
24 In reality, it might also be costly for an H-consumer to learn how many consumers have already joined
the group, possibly because of the cost to visit the sign-up website. For convenience, we assume that t
is incurred when the consumer actually signs up for group purchase, such as transaction costs to open an
account or to place an order.
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and the group size will be reached. Therefore, under the sequential format, there is indeed
an equilibrium, where the seller chooses (p; q;m) optimally, L-consumers sign up in the
rst period, and: (i) if x  x^; then H-consumers with t  t will sign up in the second
period and m will be reached, so that group participants will pay discounted price q while
non-participants (H-consumers with t > t) will pay regular price p; (ii) if x < x^; no
H-consumers will sign up and only regular price p is available.25
Comparing (22) with (20), we have t > t: That is, more H-consumers will sign up for
group purchase under the sequential than under the simultaneous format of IBmin. This
implies that, for the same bundle, group purchases will occur more often under the sequential
format. The intuition behind this nding, as in Hu, Shi, and Wu (2013), is that the
sequential format removes the uncertainty faced by period-2 consumers about the number
of participating consumers in period 1, which makes period-2 consumers more willing to
sign up. Although our model and analysis di¤er from those in Hu, Shi, and Wu (2013),26
our nding supports their conclusion that the sequential group-buying mechanism will lead
to higher deal success rates. While this implies that a seller would prefer the sequential
format if, as they assume, it aims to maximize the deal success rates, in our model the
seller, whose objective is to maximize prot, may actually prefer the simultaneous format.
To see that prot can be higher under simultaneous than under sequential IBmin, we
notice that the sellers prot function for the sequential format can be obtained by using
the prot expression for the simultaneous format in (21) but replacing t with t:
 (p; q;m) =
Z bx
m (t)
[q (x+  (t)) + p (1   (t))] f (x) dx+ p
Z m (t)
ax
f (x) dx:
(23)
While a complete comparison of prots under the two formats is rather complicated and
25Potentially there can also be an equilibrium in which some of the H-consumers with low t sign up in the
rst period, which may enhance the probability of a discrete benet of the group discount. In the appendix,
we argue that this equilibrium, when it exists, has qualitatively similar properties as the equilibrium here.
26Among other di¤erences, in their group-buying mechanisms consumers have heterogenous valuations
but identical participation costs, whereas in our model high-value consumers di¤er in participation costs but
have identical valuation.
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beyond the scope of our paper, we demonstrate that prot can be higher in the simultaneous
format with the following example:
Example 3 Assume that  (t) = 1 on [0; 1] ; f (x) = 12 on [0; 2] ; and L = 1: For di¤erent
values of H; Table 2 compares equilibrium simultaneous and sequential IBmin, denoted with
superscripts  and ; respectively.
Table 2
Simultaneous Format Sequential Format
H
1:6
1:5
1:4
p q m t  p q m t 
1:6 1 0:97 0:44 2:335 1:6 1 0:96 0:6 2: 272
1:5 1 0:80 0:40 2: 300 1:5 1 0:75 0:5 2: 26 6
1:4 1 0:62 0:35 2: 262 1:4 1 0:56 0:4 2: 246
Example 3 makes it clear that a prot-maximizing seller may prefer the simultaneous
over the sequential format. This is because the seller wishes to price discriminate when
using IBmin, and, unlike the sequential format, the simultaneous format does not remove
uncertainty for the H-consumers, thereby discouraging them from signing up to obtain the
group discount.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has conducted a strategic analysis of interpersonal bundling. As a mechanism
for option pricing under demand uncertainty, interpersonal bundling will often dominate
separate selling with just one or two bundle size intervals, and it is optimal among all
selling mechanisms under a plausible su¢ cient condition. The protability conditions of
interpersonal bundling with a minimum or maximum group size exhibit interesting simi-
larities and di¤erences: each is likely protable when the ratio of reservation prices of the
two consumer types (H=L) is within some intermediate range, and eachs prot advantage
(relative to separate selling) tends to be an inverted-U function of H=L; but IBmin (re-
spectively, IBmax) tends to be more protable when the number of low-value (respectively,
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high-value) consumers is more dispersed. Furthermore, the protability of IBmin will be
enhanced if the incentive to qualify for group purchase motivates buyers to disseminate
product information, and if more high-value consumers can be induced to pay the regular
instead of the discounted price.
Like other selling formats, interpersonal bundling can achieve its potential benets for
the seller only if it is properly implemented. In particular, losses may occur if the bundle
discount under group purchase is too big. For example, when a restaurant o¤ers a group
coupon for 70% o¤ its regular price, it could be unwisely pricing below marginal cost.27
While many businesses have proted from o¤ering IBmin on the Internet, there have also
been media reports about how a merchant is hurt by its deep group discount through
Groupon and other social buying intermediaries.28 Part of the problem is a potential
conict in incentives: even though the seller should use the advertised deal to maximize
its prot, an intermediary like Groupon benets from a higher deal success rate. However,
it need not be in the best interests of the sellers (and, in the long run, also their Internet
intermediaries such as Groupon) to focus only on deal success rates. As our theory suggests,
the sellers prot is sometimes higher when the deal is o¤ if the realized number of low-
value consumers is not high.29 And, it would be even worse for sellers if below-cost group
sale prices are used to boost deal success rates.
We have studied monopoly interpersonal bundling in this paper. It would be desirable
27The restaurant may want to attract repeat customers by taking a one-time loss, but is the loss necessary?
Our analysis suggests that interpersonal bundling can be protable without the repeat-business e¤ect, and
a seller need not incur losses in order to generate repeat businesses.
28See, for example, Groupon demand almost nishes cupcake-maker (November 22, 2011, The Tele-
graph), which tells the story of a British cakemaker who o¤ered her product at 75% o¤ its regular price
through Groupon and had to produce at costs substantially above price in order to meet a huge demand
increase. See also Byers, Mitzenmacher and Zervas (2012) for discussions about negative side e¤ects for
merchants using Groupon.
29As a form of advertising, IBmin on the Internet can also serve as a promotional device that encourages
consumers to try the product and become repeat customers. While we do not model such roles, they can
also be important. Indeed, some sellers may have used Groupon as an advertising platform to attract repeat
customers, or to ll up their o¤-peak capacity.
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for future research to analyze interpersonal bundling by competing rms. The protability
of this selling strategy, and its potential adoption by a rm, may then depend on compet-
itive conditions, possibly also including considerations such as product di¤erentiation. For
tractability, our model has made some restrictive assumptions, such as that there are only
two types of consumers. It would be desirable for future research to extend the analysis
to more general settings. While our analysis has demonstrated the protability of general
bundle menus, it remains to be seen when they will be implemented by innovative rms.
The simple form of a maximum bundle size, though, can perhaps easily nd its protable
applications in the Internet market.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Corollary 2. From (i), Hy  L  y + xF^  : Hence under separate selling the
optimal price is H for either F^x or Fx: It follows that
^   ^s =
Z Z
x+ym^
[L (x+ y) Hy] dF^x (x) dFy (y) +Hy  Hy

Z by
ay
(Z b^x
m y
[Lx  (H   L) y] dF^x (x)
)
dFy (y) ;
where the inequality is due to revealed preference. Since F^x (x) < Fx (x) for x  m   y
from (ii), we haveZ b^x
m y
[Lx  (H   L) y] dF^x (x)
=
h
Lb^x   (H   L) y
i
  [Lm  Hy] F^x (m   y) 
Z bx
m y
LF^x (x) dx 
Z b^x
bx
LF^x (x) dx
> [Lbx   (H   L) y]  [Lm  Hy] F^x (m   y) 
Z bx
m y
LFx (x) dx:
Thus
^   ^s >
Z by
ay
[Lbx   (H   L) y] dFy (y) 
Z by
ay
[Lm  Hy] ~Fx (m   y) dFy (y)
 
Z by
ay
Z bx
m y
LFx (x) dxdFy (y) :
(from (iii)) 
Z by
ay
[Lbx   (H   L) y] dFy (y) 
Z by
ay
[Lm  Hy]Fx (m   y) dFy (y)
 
Z by
ay
Z bx
m y
LFx (x) dxdFy (y)
=
Z bx
m y
[Lx  (H   L) y] dFx (x) =    s:
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Proof of Proposition 5. First, in equilibrium, i satises (18). The rms problem is:
max
qL<pH;m
 (p; q;m) (24)
= q

[1  (1  )n]
Z
xm n k
(x+ n+ k) dF (x) + (1  )n
Z
xm n
(x+ n) dF (x)

+p [[1  (1  )n] (n+ k)F (m  n  k) + (1  )n nF (m  n)] :
Next, from (18) and with C 00  0; we have    (p; q;m) increasing in p and decreasing
in q; and furthermore
@ (p; q;m)
@m
=
(p  q) [f (m  n)  f (m  n  k)] (1  )n 1
(n  1) (p  q) [F (m  n)  F (m  n  k)] (1  )n 2 + C 00 :
Thus  (p; q;m) is increasing in m at m = n + ax but decreasing in m at m = n + k + bx:
At the optimum,  (p; q;m) must increase in : Thus, since  (p; q;m) and  (p; q;m) both
increase in p; the solution to problem (24) must have p = H; so that problem (24) becomes
maxqL;m  (H; q;m) : Next,
@ (H; q;m)
@
= qn (1  )n 1
Z
xm n k
(x+ n+ k) dF (x) 
Z
xm n
(x+ n) dF (x)

+Hn (1  )n 1 [(n+ k)F (m  n  k)  nF (m  n)] ;
with
@
@

m=n+ax
= qn (1  )n 1 k > 0; @
@

m=n+k+bx
= Hn (1  )n 1 k > 0:
Next, since Hn  L (n+ ax) by assumption (A2),
@ (H; q;m)
@m

m=n+ax
= [1  (1  )n] [H (n+ k)  qm] f (m  n  k)jm=n+ax
+ (1  )n (Hn  qm) f (m  n)jm=n+ax +
@ (p; q;m)
@
@ (p; q;m)
@m

m=n+ax
 @ (p; q;m)
@

m=n+ax
@ (p; q;m)
@

m=n+k+bx
> 0:
On the other hand; atm = n+k+bx;
@(p;q;m)
@
@(p;q;m)
@m < 0; f (m  n) = 0; f (m  n  k) >
0;  is not a¤ected by q from (18), but  (H; q;m) increases in q; which implies that q = L
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at m = n + k + bx: And since H (n+ k)  L (n+ k + bx) by assumption (A2); we have
@(H;q;m)
@m

m=n+k+bx
< 0: Therefore, the equilibriumm is interior: m 2 (n+ ax; n+ k + bx) :
It follows from (18) that  > 0:
Alternative Equilibrium under Sequential IBmin in Section 4.2
We argue below that at the alternative equilibrium (see footnote 25), the H-consumers
who join group purchase and the sellers optimal choice of (p; q;m) are the same as those
in the equilibrium in Section 4.2 under the sequential format, even though some of the
group-buying H-consumers sign up in period 1 here.
Consider a potential equilibrium where all L- and some H-consumers with cost t  t0
sign up in the rst period and the H-consumers with cost t 2 (t0; t (x)] sign up in the
second period. Given an equilibrium cuto¤ value t; a consumer with t > t0 will choose
to sign up in the second period if
H   q   t  H   p and x+   t0+  (t)    t0  m:
The cuto¤ values of t and x are thus identical to those in condition (22) on p. 29. Moreover,
there exists t0 > 0 such that H-type consumers with t  t0 optimally sign up in the rst
period. This is because the expected benet of an early sign-up, which is discount (H   L)
multiplied by the expected increase in the probability of reaching the minimum bundle size,
is a positive constant and thus, for a su¢ ciently low t; there exists a cuto¤ t0 2 (t; t) such
that the consumer with t = t0 is indi¤erent between signing up in rst period or not doing
so. Accordingly, the rm will o¤er the optimal (p; q;m) that maximizes (23) on p.30.
Therefore, if we compare the equilibrium discussed here with the one in Section 4.2 under
sequential format, the cuto¤ value t for the marginal H-consumer who join group purchase
(t and t, respectively) and the optimal (p; q;m) are characterized by the same set of
equations, even though some of the group-buying H-consumers sign up in period 1 here.
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